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The purpose of this paper is to study, within a general equilibrium framework, the 
welfare implications of a balanced-budget tax reform for an externality-generating 
intermediate input in a second-best economic environment. For purposes of concreteness, the 
focus is on tax reform for freight road transport to cope with congestion externalities; results 
for other types of externalities can be derived as special cases. The model takes into account 
that passenger and freight flows jointly produce congestion, it captures feedback effects in 
demand, and it allows for existing distortions on all other input and output markets, including 
the passenger transport market and the labour market. Moreover, it clearly shows that the 
welfare effects of the reform depend on the instruments used to recycle the tax revenues. A 
numerical version of the model is calibrated to UK data. The numerical results suggest, 
among others, that (i) the welfare gain of a given freight tax reform rises with the level of the 
tax on the market for passenger transport; (ii) the higher the rate of passenger transport 
taxation, the lower the optimal freight tax; and (iii) compared to lump-sum recycling, both the 
welfare effects of a tax reform and the optimal tax are substantially higher when revenues are 
recycled via labour taxes.  
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I. Introduction 
 
It is well-known that under a number of stringent conditions on the structure of the 
economy, including constant returns to scale, the absence of externalities and the availability 
of a full set of tax instruments, intermediate inputs should not be taxed (Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971)). More recently, it has become clear that relaxing the assumptions does 
provide a case for taxing intermediate inputs. First, if for administrative, political or technical 
reasons some final goods remain untaxed, Newbery (1986) has shown in a very general 
framework that intermediate input taxation is indeed desirable under relatively mild 
conditions. Second, taxation seems in order for intermediate inputs that generate externalities. 
For example, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) construct a simple general equilibrium model to 
analyse optimal taxation of both final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities. 
They show that dirty intermediate goods should be taxed at marginal external cost. This 
implies that, consistent with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), production efficiency is 
maintained and that there is no additional revenue-generating role for taxes on intermediate 
inputs.  
The purpose of this paper is to study the welfare implications, within a general 
equilibrium framework, of a balanced-budget reform of taxes on a dirty intermediate input in 
a second-best environment. Although the desirability of dirty input taxation has been 
investigated before in applied general equilibrium models (see, e.g., Ballard and Medema 
(1993)), fundamental questions remain as to the trade-offs involved in reforming such taxes
1. 
For example, to what extent does the desirability of any one reform depend on the vector of 
existing commodity and input taxes? What if dirty output markets are not subject to an 
environmental tax, or if such taxes are clearly set at suboptimal levels? To what extent are the 
welfare gains from a tax reform on dirty inputs likely to depend on the instruments chosen to 
recycle the revenues? In this paper, we develop a simple yet general framework for studying 
dirty input tax reforms that allows us to provide answers to these and other relevant questions. 
Given the importance of intermediate inputs (energy, fertilizers, pesticides, freight transport, 
etc.) in the generation of externalities, developing such a framework seems to be a useful 
addition to the existing literature.  
The model we develop is sufficiently general to capture a wide variety of different 
types of intermediate inputs and the corresponding externalities they generate. However, to 
make the presentation as concrete as possible, both the theoretical model and the numerical 
                                                      
1 Ballard and Medema (1983) introduce a Pigovian tax on air pollution from 11 sectors of the US 
economy. Pollution is modeled as both a production and consumption externality. They estimate that 
the marginal welfare cost of a pollution tax is significantly below one.   2
simulation model used for the empirical application are developed in terms of a particular 
example, viz., the problem of reforming taxes on freigth road transport in view of increasing 
congestion. In theoretical terms, there is little loss of generality in focusing on congestion-
type externalities. Such externalities affect both consumers and producers and are well known 
to have feedback effects on demand. As will be highlighted below, a simplified version of the 
model can also be used to study a number of other input taxes, such as energy taxes, taxes on 
pesticides, etc. Importantly, however, in focusing on freight transport and congestion 
externalities, we are also able to contribute to the substantial recent literature on tax reform in 
the transport sector (see, e.g., Mayeres and Proost (2001), Parry and Bento (2002a,b)). Either 
these models explicitly consider an urban environment and do not incorporate freight 
transport, or they include freight transport but focus exclusively on tax reform for the 
passenger transport market.  
The application of the theoretical model to freight transport tax reform is highly 
policy-relevant in view of recent discussions within the EU
2. There the emphasis has shifted 
very much towards taxation of road freight transport instead of passenger transport. This is to 
some extent due to the feeling that, in the short run, charging passengers for the external costs 
they create seems infeasible at a European scale for both political and technical reasons. An 
additional explanation is that international traffic flows throughout Europe to a large extent 
consist of freight flows; as a consequence, taxing and regulating freight flows is seen more as 
a European and less as a local problem to be solved by individual countries. Obviously, the 
focus on freight transport tax reform raises a number of interesting policy questions. Given 
that passenger transport is sub-optimally taxed, which seems to be the case in many European 
countries (De Borger and Proost (2001)), how desirable is it to raise freight transport taxes to 
cope with external congestion and pollution costs? To what extent is the desirability of a tax 
reform on freight affected by the existence of distortions on other markets, both within 
(passenger transport) and outside (e.g., the labour market) the transport market? How 
sensitive is the optimal freight tax to changes in existing taxes on passenger flows? Do higher 
taxes on passenger flows imply higher or lower optimal freight taxes?  
Although answering these questions seems to be a straightforward exercise in second-
best reasoning, the analysis is complicated by at least four factors: (i) Taxes on intermediate 
inputs are partially used to correct a distortion on final goods markets; (ii) Intermediate goods 
taxes may have nonnegligible general equilibrium effects on all markets, including the labour 
                                                      
2 A recent white paper (European Community (2001)) provides an interesting overview of the current 
policy debate. While some member states have introduced a system of road-damage charges 
(vignettes), the availability of a new European Satellite Navigation System makes route-specific and 
time-specific charges technically feasible. Germany will be introducing kilometre taxes in the near 
future. The white paper also discusses how to use the revenues and seems to favour investing them 
within the transport sector.    3
market; (iii) Passenger and freight transport share the same infrastructure and hence jointly 
cause congestion. As a consequence, tax changes on one market automatically affect the 
marginal external cost on the other transport market; (iv) Congestion causes feedback effects 
in demand. The current paper develops a model that incorporates all these complications. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section II, we present the structure of the model. We 
then proceed by deriving the welfare effects of a tax reform in the freight transport sector 
under different restrictions on the available tax instruments; moreover, several alternatives for 
the recycling of the tax revenues are considered (see Section III). A number of simplified 
cases are analysed that clarify the main intuition of the results. In Section IV we present the 
main characteristics of the numerical simulation model that is calibrated to the UK economy. 
Empirical results on the welfare effects of tax reform in the freight transport sector are 
derived and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI summarises the main conclusions. 
   
 
II.  The theoretical model 
 
II.1.  Behaviour of consumers 
 
We assume N identical consumers. The consumer maximises a twice differentiable, 
strictly quasi-concave utility function defined over a clean good C (the untaxed numeraire in 
the model), a good associated with dirty production, (D), a good associated with dirty 
consumption (T), and leisure, denoted byA: 
  (,,,) UCTDA  (1) 
We interpret good D as an aggregate commodity that uses freight transport as an input in 
production, while T is interpreted as passenger transport. Freight and passenger transport 
demand jointly produce an externality, interpreted as congestion. Adding other external costs 
such as pollution and noise is straightforward and does not affect the results. 
The individual faces two constraints. First, the budget restriction is formulated as  
  TD Cq Tq Dw LG ++ = +  (2) 
where the  i q  are consumer prices, w is the net wage, L is labour supply, and G is a lump-sum 
transfer from the government.  Second, a time constraint  
  () LN T F T L φ ++ + = A  (3)   4
allocates the total time available (L ) over labour, leisure and travel time. The congestion 
function  (.) φ  gives the travel time needed per unit of T; this depends on passenger (NT) and 
freight (F) transport demand. Note that in the theoretical model we assume for simplicity that 
the contribution of passenger and freight transport to congestion is the same.  
We assign multipliers λ and  γ  to the budget and time constraints, respectively. 
Utility maximising behaviour then leads to demand functions for all goods considered as 
functions of the exogenous prices, wages, the lump-sum transfer, and the level of congestion 
(.) φ which the consumer treats as exogenously given. The indirect utility function can 











II.2. Producer  behaviour 
 
The production structure of the economy is kept as simple as possible
3. We assume a 
linear aggregate production function that relates the production of passenger transport, the 
clean consumption good, the dirty intermediate input (freight transport), and an extra clean 
intermediate input (X) to a single primary input, labour. Moreover, units are adjusted such 
that: 
 () NT C F X L N ++ +≤  (4) 
For a given level of externality, we further assume that the dirty good is produced under 
constant returns to scale, combining freight and the clean intermediate good: 
 
 (,;) ND CRS F X φ =  
Under these assumptions, the producer prices for T, C, F, X and L all equal unity.  
We denote inputs demand in unit terms:  ; ND ND F NDF X NDX == , where  ND F  is 
the demand for freight transport per unit of production of the dirty good; a similar 
                                                      
3 We wish to capture two effects of a tax on the dirty input: firstly, an input substitution effect and, 
secondly, a switch in consumption as relative commodity prices change. Our model structure is the 
simplest which captures both effects. Note that the input tax will alter both the price of D and T since 
congestion affects the generalised price of passenger transport. We feel that a more general n-good 
Leontief production structure would give little additional economic insight, yet would significantly 
complicate the analysis.   5
interpretation holds for the other input X. Allowing for intermediate good taxes  i τ  (i=F, X), 
set by the government, input demands depend on taxes and congestion levels. The unit cost 
function of good D, D c , can be written as: 
 (,, )( 1 ) * (,, )( 1 ) * (,, ) DFX F N DFX X N DFX cF X ττφ ττ τ φ ττ τ φ =+ ++  (5) 
Under competitive assumptions, the producer price of good D equals this unit cost. 
 
II.3.  Role of the government 
 
A benevolent government is assumed to maximise welfare, defined here as the value 
of the representative consumer’s indirect utility function V(.). It has in principle the 
authority to set taxes τ on all markets though, without loss of generality, we take the 




































We assume the government is required
4 to maintain a balanced budget. This requires: 
  [ ] () TL D F N D X N D NT L F XDN G ττ τ τ τ +++ + = (6) 
 
III.  Welfare effects of a tax reform on freight transport 
 
In this section we consider the welfare impact of a revenue neutral increase in the tax 
on freight. For purposes of exposition, we initially assume that the tax revenues are recycled 
through raising the lump-sum transfer G. Later (see Section III.4 below) we also consider 
                                                      
4 This constraint is automatically fulfilled: combining the production possibility constraint, the 
consumer budget constraint and the unit cost function for the dirty good gives the government budget 
constraint (Walras’ law).   6
recycling through a reduction in the distortionary labour tax. We first present the general 
result and then consider some specific examples to facilitate the interpretation. 
Using standard but rather extensive manipulations it can be shown that the welfare 

















F dW D D dG






















     ∂ ∂∂   =− −+− −      ∂∂ ∂       
  ∂∂
−− −   ∂∂  
 ∂∂
−− +  ∂∂ 
  ∂ ∂∂
++ +   ∂∂ ∂  
 ∂







−   ∂ 
 (7) 
 
where MEC is the full marginal external cost of freight or passenger transport. The derivation 
of this result as well as the precise definition of the full marginal external cost, is explained in 
detail in Appendix 1. Note that the external costs of passenger and freight transport are 
assumed to be the same in order to simplify the theoretical analysis. This assumption will 
obviously be relaxed in the numerical exercise of the next sections. 
In the remainder of this section we turn to the interpretation of (7). It consists of five 
terms. Each term can be considered as a distortive tax wedge multiplied by the general 
equilibrium change in demand that results from the tax reform. Unfortunately, since the 
model allows existing distortions on all markets simultaneously it is very difficult to derive 
general conclusions from this equation without simplifying assumptions. At this point, 
however, note the following immediate implications of equation (7). First, unlike in earlier 
work on transport tax reform, all effects that operate via input markets and production costs 
are explicitly incorporated. Second, (7) immediately implies that transport taxes equal to 
MEC and all other taxes equal to zero is consistent with the welfare optimum, since in that 
case the marginal welfare effect of an increase in the freight tax is zero. Third, suppose that 
all other taxes are at their first-best levels but that the tax on freight transport falls short of 
MEC. In that case welfare will increase if the tax on freight is marginally increased, provided 
that the general equilibrium impact of the freight tax is to reduce freight transport demand. 
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where the term between square bracketts is the full effect of the freight tax increase on freight 
demand. It consists of three terms. Increasing the price of freight has a non-positive impact on 
the demand for freight for a given production level of D, thus ensuring that the first element is 
non-negative. Assuming that D is a normal good, the (uncompensated) own price effect is 
non-positive, and hence the second-term is also non-negative. The third term reflects the 
effect on freight transport demand associated with recycling the freight tax revenues. 
Although without further restrictions this term is theoretically ambiguous, it is clear that, 
under the specified conditions, as long as the overall effect between the square bracketts is 
positive, an increase in the freight tax rate from any level below MEC raises welfare. Welfare 
gains are exhausted when the freight tax equals MEC.   
To develop further intuition on the interpretation of (7) we turn to some special cases 
below. Before doing so, however, it is useful to point out that the applicability of (7) is not 
restricted to the case of congestion externalities and freight transport tax reform. With minor 
adjustments it can also be used to study tax reform for other intermediate inputs that generate 
other types of externalities. For example, unlike in the model considered above (where 
passenger and freight services jointly produce the externality), in many cases of practical 
relevance (e.g., fertilizers, pesticides, energy), the externality is produced by the intermediate 
input only. It then suffices to set  T MEC τ = and to re-interpret the tax  F τ  in (7) appropriately 
as a tax on, e.g., fertilizer. As another example, some externalities do not imply feedbacks in 
demand and/or do not affect production costs (e.g., emissions of various pollutants). As 
shown in Appendix 1, such examples can also be interpreted as special cases of the more 
general formulation (7).  
 
 
III.1.  Under-priced passenger transport 
 
As a first special case, we focus on the relation between the welfare effect of a freight 
transport tax reform and the level of taxation on the market for passenger transport. Indeed, a 
relevant question to ask in view of recent policy discussions is the following: given that 
passenger transport is below marginal external cost, under what conditions does it make sense 
to raise the tax on freight transport? If raising the tax on freight transport increases the   8
demand for passenger transport then there is an additional cost to the policy reform, viz., the 
resulting increase in the distortion on the passenger transport market. In this case the net 
benefit of higher freight transport prices may well be exhausted at a level below MEC. To get 
some initial intuition concerning this issue, we therefore consider the case where all taxes, 
except the transport taxes, are set at their first-best levels and where passenger transport is 
priced below marginal external cost. In other words,  0 DXL τττ ===  and  T MEC τ < . 
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 (8) 
Equation (8) illustrates the simple but important point referred to above: in judging 
the desirability of a freight transport tax increase, the general equilibrium effects of this 
change on existing distortions on the passenger transport market play a crucial role. They are 
summarised by the second line of (8). Higher freight taxes affect passenger transport demand 
via three channels. Firstly, at constant congestion levels, higher freight taxes raise the price of 
the dirty good, which alters demand for passenger transport; this is captured by the first term 
between brackets on the second line of (8). In general, of course, passenger transport can be 
either a substitute or complement to the dirty good (in uncompensated terms). This accords 
with well-known second-best rules about taxation of an externality in the presence of an 
incorrectly priced alternative (Marchand, 1968). Secondly, freight tax revenues allow the 
government to alter the lump-sum transfer to maintain the constant budget. Demand for 
passenger transport varies in response to this change in G-- see the second term between 
brackets. Importantly, there is a third, more indirect channel through which freight taxes 
affect passenger demand. An increase in freight taxes obviously affects congestion, and hence 
passenger demand is expected to rise at constant final goods prices. This effect is captured by 
the feedback term and taken into account in the definition of the MEC.     
To see the role of the distortion on the passenger market most clearly, start from an 
initial situation where the tax on freight is equal to marginal external cost. Then (8) implies 
that social welfare can be increased or reduced by raising the tax on freight, depending on the 
overall impact of the tax reform on the demand for passenger transport, as previously 
discussed. If raising the price of freight transport increases the demand for passenger 
transport, welfare increases when the tax on freight is lowered below MEC. Untaxed 
passenger transport implies a distortion due to excessive congestion; under the stated 
condition reducing the tax on freight reduces this distortion. Likewise, if raising the price of   9
freight reduces demand for passenger transport, welfare would increase if one raised the tax 
on freight above MEC.  
Of course, the above simple statements have to be qualified if the initial freight tax is 
above or below marginal external cost. In that case the effects of changing the freight tax 
affects both the distortion on the passenger market and on the freight market; these effects  
must be traded off against one another. For example, even if increasing freight taxes raised 
passenger transport and hence congestion, it might still be welfare-improving to increase 
freight taxes if freight was also strongly under-priced in the initial equilibrium. In that case, 
although raising the freight tax increases congestion by passengers and hence the distortion on 
this market, it reduces the distortion on the freight transport market.     
To conclude the discussion of this special case, note that interpreting (8) from an 
optimal taxation viewpoint yields some simple additional insights. Under the assumptions 
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This result has two straightforward policy implications. First, more congestion and hence a 
larger marginal external cost does not necessarily imply a higher optimal freight transport tax. 
The reason is that, although the larger distortion on the freight market induces higher freight 
taxes, the higher MEC (at a given passenger transport tax) also raises the distortion on the 
passenger transport market. This may necessitate lower freight transport taxes if this helps to 
reduce this distortion (this depends on whether passenger transport and the dirty good are 
complements or substitutes). Second, higher taxes on passenger transport may for the same 
reason both increase or decrease the optimal tax on freight transport. On the one hand, higher 
passenger transport taxes reduce congestion, which reduces the optimal freight transport tax. 
On the other hand, however, increasing the passenger transport tax reduces the distortion on 
the passenger market, which may induce higher freight transport taxes. In sum, even on the 
transport market alone it may be necessary to take into account important general equilibrium 
effects.     
 
   10
III.2.  Output taxes and subsidies on clean inputs 
 
It is well known that when, for whatever reason, a tax cannot be placed on a dirty 
input, it may be replaced by an output tax combined with a subsidy to the clean input 
(Fullerton (1997), Fullerton and Mohr (2002))
5. In this subsection, we explore the interaction 
between freight transport taxes, taxes on the dirty production good D, and subsidies to the 
clean input X. To do so, suppose that  0 L τ =  and that passenger transport is priced at 
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This expression summarises how the welfare effects of a freight tax change depend on the 
potential existence of dirty output taxes and clean input subsidies. To facilitate the 
interpretation, note that the freight tax affects demand for D via two channels: the increase in 
consumer price and the induced change of the transfer G. Both effects are captured by the 
final term between brackets in (9). If D is a normal good, the sign of this term is ambiguous. 
Plausibly, however, one expects the demand for good D to decline when the freight tax rises.
  Let us start from a situation where freight is taxed at marginal external cost. Equation 
(9) then describes how the desirability of having freight transport taxes deviate from MEC 
depends on  D τ  and  X τ . More precisely, reducing the tax below MEC is welfare improving as 
long as the sum of the two terms on the second line of (9) is negative. First, assume that an 
output tax on D is in place. As long as higher freight transport taxes reduce the demand for D, 
(9) shows that the existence of  0 D τ >  implies that reducing the tax on freight transport 
below MEC is welfare improving. One interpretation is that lowering the transport tax 
reduces the existing distortion on the output market. Another way to interpret the result is to 
note that, since freight transport is taxed at MEC, the existence of the output tax effectively 
implies that the externality caused by freight is ‘overtaxed’; hence, reducing  F τ  below MEC 
is welfare improving. Second, consider the existence of input subsidies on X ( 0 X τ < ). Note 
from (9) that they affect the desirability of changing freight taxes in two opposite ways, 
                                                      
5 This is quite intuitive. Higher taxes on D and higher subsidies on X may, under some conditions, both 
serve to reduce freight transport demand and, hence, indirectly correct the congestion externality. 
   11
reflecting an input subsitution and an output effect. For a given output level D, raising the 
freight tax increases the demand for X and therefore increases the distortion on the clean input 
market. However, if the higher tax on freight ultimately reduces the demand for D, this 
reduces the existing distortion on the output market. If the input substitution effect dominates, 
(9) shows that the subsidy on the clean input also increases the desirability of reducing the 
freight tax below MEC. Third, in the case of combinations of dirty output taxes and clean 
input subsidies, note that a sufficient condition for reductions in freight transport taxes below 
MEC to be welfare improving is given by 
0 DX N D X ττ +>  
This condition states that the net implied tax per unit of D is positive.  
Of course, if we evaluate the desirability of a freight transport tax change in a 
situation where freight transport is not paying the full marginal social cost, then the 
distortions on all tree markets have to be traded off. For example, (9) implies that an increase 
in the freight transport tax is justified if the initial tax is substantially below MEC and output 
taxes on freight-intensive goods are insufficient to capturing external congestion costs. 
Similarly, if there is little substitutability between inputs and a relatively large subsidy exists 
on the clean input, raising freight transport taxes is justified. Under these conditions, the clean 
input subsidy has little effect on externalities and acts as a pure distortion. Taxing freight 
reduces demand for D and thus X. 
  
 
III.3.  A distorted labour market 
 
As a third special case, we illustrate the role of potential distortions on the labour 
market associated with the existence of positive labour taxes. Specifically, assume that 
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Assume initially that the tax on freight is also set at marginal external cost. Then (10) tells us 
that lowering the tax on freight below MEC increases welfare if it boosts labour supply. 
Similarly, raising freight taxes seems desirable if it implies higher labour supply. The second 
line of (10) shows that labour supply is affected both via the increase in the price of the dirty 
good and from the redistributed revenues. If we assume that the dirty good is a substitute for   12
leisure (in uncompensated terms), and that leisure is a normal good then increasing the tax on 
freight tends to reduce labour supply and, therefore, it is welfare improving to reduce the 
freight tax below MEC. This results accords with the large double-dividend literature in 
which optimal externality taxes reflect pre-existing labour market distortions (Bovenberg and 
van der Ploeg, 1994). As before, however, note that these findings have to be qualified if the 
initial freight tax is above or below MEC.   
 
 
III.4. Alternative  recycling  instruments: recycling via labour taxes 
 
Finally, the presence of the distortionary labour tax in second-best situations raises 
the issue of using alternative recycling instruments. Indeed, all previous exercises were based 
on equation (7), which was derived under the assumption that recycling operated via the 
lump-sum transfer G. In this subsection, however, we consider recycling of an increase in 
freight taxes via the labour tax. Using completely analogous procedures as those described in 
Appendix 1, it is easily shown that the welfare effect of a tax reform on freight transport in 
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is the balanced-budget impact of raising the freight transport tax on the labour 
tax, taking account of all general equilibrium adjustments in demands. In other words, it 
reflects the potential for reducing labour taxes as a consequence of the freight tax increase.   13
To illustrate the crucial relevance of the recycling instrument let us consider the same 
assumptions as in the previous case III.3, viz. 0 L τ > ,  0 XD ττ == , and  T MEC τ = , and 
analyse the difference with lump-sum recycling for this simplified case. The equivalent of 
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 (11) 
Interpretation of (11) is similar to (10). When freight is taxed at MEC, reducing the tax is 
welfare-improving if it increases labour supply. However, notice an important difference 
between the second lines of (11) and (10). Whilst returning revenues via G is likely to reduce 
labour supply because leisure is a normal good, using freight tax receipts to reduce labour 
taxes is much more likely to increase labour supply, assuming positive wage elasticities of 
labour supply. This suggests that reducing freight taxes are more desirable if recycling is 
through labour taxes than via G. Alternatively, it reflects the fact that using freight revenues 
to reduce labour taxes weakens the cost of raising the freight tax relative to the lump-sum 
instrument. Increasing the tax on freight results in higher welfare costs (from exacerbating the 




IV.  Basic Features of the Numerical Simulation Model 
 
In the previous section we studied a simple framework to analyse the welfare effects 
of a freight transport tax reform in the presence of existing distortions on other markets, 
including the market for passenger transport. Although intuition could be gained by 
considering some simplified cases, the existence of various simultaneous distortions made an 
overall theoretical evaluation rather complicated. In this section, we therefore turn to the 
development of a numerical version of the analytical model that will be used in the next 
sections to perform some numerical simulations, based on data for the UK, to get more insight 
in the effects of transport tax reform.  
The model that we construct adopts a standard nested constant-elasticity of 
substitution (CES) structure for both production and consumer utility. The benchmark 
equilibrium is constructed from three main sources of data: firstly, a detailed 18-sector input-
output matrix of the U.K. economy is used to aggregate benchmark expenditures on the clean   14
and dirty good, passenger transport and freight inputs; secondly, the relationship between 
freight and passenger transport demand and speed is calibrated to recently published U.K. 
government statistics; and, finally, information on benchmark transport taxes is drawn from a 
recent U.K. study. Some of the details of the numerical model and its calibration to the 
available data for the UK economy are delegated to Appendix 2
6. Here we simply describe 
some general features of the model.   
 
 
IV.1. Household  behaviour 
 
A standard nested CES structure is employed to model household utility. This choice 
implies that, for a given level of the externality, preferences are homothetic. The nesting 
structure is summarised in Figure 1. Utility is specified as a function of leisure and aggregate 
consumption. This composite good consists of passenger transport and non-transport 
consumption goods. The latter are further divided into clean and dirty consumption goods. 
Recall dirty consumer goods are goods that require freight transport services in production; 
the latter produce external costs.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Three elasticities-of-substitution are exogenously given in the utility tree. We denote 
them by  i σ , where  1, 2,3 i =  corresponding to the level of the tree. As with the production 
structure, these values are chosen such that own and cross-price elasticities correspond with 
the empirical literature (see Appendix 2). We experimented with a range of nesting structures: 
our choice in Figure 1 best replicates our desired elasticities. 
 
 
IV.2. Production technology  
 
We adopt a standard method of introducing a congestion externality into an applied 
general equilibrium model. Congestion is modelled via the supply of road speed, S , which is 
treated like a public good available to the consumer. However, its quantity depends on the 
total demand for freight and passenger transport,  (,) Sf F T = , where both first derivatives 
                                                      
6 In addition, the code used in this model is available at http://home.jesus.ox.ac.uk/~ecalthro/   15
are negative ( ,0 TF ff < ). The specific functional form chosen for this congestion function is 
detailed in Appendix 2 below.  
Passenger trips T are produced using a fixed combination of the clean input X (i.e. 
money expenditures) and an aggregate time input, denoted by  T Z . In turn, this aggregate 
input is produced via a CES function combining road speed, S , and leisure, A. Specifically, 
 
1
(,) [ ( 1 ) ]
TT T
TT T ZS S
ρρ ρ αα =+ − AA  
where  T α  and  T ρ  are parameters. The latter parameter is a simple function of the elasticity-
of-input-substitution parameter,  T σ ; namely,  (1 ) / TT T ρ σσ =− . The value of the parameters 
is calibrated such that the resulting own-price and cross-price elasticities are in-line with the 
empirical literature (see Appendix 2). 
The underlying micro-economics of the adopted approach is simple: reducing the 
quantity of road speed increases its shadow price, thus the representative consumer employs 
more leisure time in the production of any given number of passenger transport trips.  
Freight transport is produced in an analogous manner using the clean input X together 
with an aggregate time input, F Z . In contrast with the production of passenger transport, the 
time input for freight combines labour supply with S , rather than leisure time: i.e. 
(,) F Z CES S L = . The clean final consumption good, C ,and the clean input,  X , are both 
produced using the single input labour. Finally, in accordance with our analytical model, the 
dirty good, D, is produced as a CES function of freight and the clean input: 
(, ) DC E S F X = , with an elasticity-of-input-substitution parameter, denoted by  D σ . 
 
 
IV.3. The benchmark equilibrium 
 
The model is calibrated to a benchmark equilibrium. Total expenditures on 
consumption goods and inputs must be specified. We calibrate the model to the United 
Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland) for 1995. This is chosen largely because we have 
access to a social accounting matrix (SAM) for the UK in 1995, constructed as part of a 
dynamic general equilibrium model for 14 member states of the European Union: GEM-E3 
(Van Regemorter and Capros, 2002). The SAM distinguishes 18 sectors – including freight 
transport. Aggregating this information allows us to specify expenditure shares for the 5 
market commodities in our economy: C, D, T, F and X. Appendix 2 gives more detailed 
information on the procedure used. It also contains a matrix of benchmark own- and cross-  16
price elasticities, which is argued to be consistent in sign and magnitude with available 
econometric evidence.  
 
 
V.  Road freight tax reform: numerical results 
 
The benchmark economy we consider is characterised by (excise and ownership) 
taxes on both passenger and freight transport (at rates of 35 per cent) and on labour supply (at 
30 per cent). In addition, consumption goods are taxed at the standard rate of value-added tax 
(17.5 per cent). In reforming the tax rate on transport markets, we consider both recycling via 
the lump-sum transfer and via the labour tax. Initially, we assume labour tax recycling: the 
government is constrained to maintain the real-value of the benchmark transfer to the 
representative consumer; the labour supply tax is endogenously adjusted. Later in this section 
we also compare the results when government returns revenues in a lump-sum manner.  
Figure 2 summarises the basic welfare implications of the model in the case of labour 
tax recycling
7. The figure gives the percentage welfare change (vertical axis) as a function of 
the tax rate on freight transport, where all other taxes except the labour tax are kept at their 
benchmark values (a range from 75 to 115 per cent is considered on the horizontal axis; 
remember that the benchmark tax rate on freight is 35 per cent). Three different scenarios are 
considered, each one assuming different degrees of price sensitivity of passenger transport 
demand with respect to the price of freight. Varying this price sensitivity is potentially 
important. Indeed, recall the central result from our analytical model: that any benefit from 
raising the freight tax needs to be weighed against the cost from exacerbating the distortion 
on, amongst others, the passenger transport market. The magnitude of this cost depends, at 
least in part, on the sensitivity of passenger transport demand to an increase in the price of 
freight.  
Section III.1 discussed three channels through which passenger transport demand is 
altered. The first channel is a standard gross-substitution effect: the (uncompensated) demand 
for passenger transport reacts to the increase in the price of the good D. Ignoring the impact 
of recycling tax revenues (the second channel), the third channel is a feedback effect: lower 
freight demand reduces the level of congestion, and thus reduces the generalised price of 
passenger transport. The magnitude of the effect via the first channel depends, within the 
framework of our model, to a large extent on the value chosen for the elasticity of substitution 
between passenger transport and other commodities ( 2 σ  in Figure 1), while the magnitude of 
                                                      
7 The sensitivity of the results with respect to some crucial parameters is summarised in Appendix 3.   17
the feedback effect depends significantly on the own-price elasticity of freight input-demand, 
which in turn depends on the value of the substitution parameter between freight inputs and 
other inputs ( D σ ). 
Under benchmark values for  2 σ  and  D σ , Appendix 2 reports that the generalised-
cross price elasticity of freight on passenger transport demand equals 0.08. This value was 
used in our benchmark scenario (labelled ‘bmk’). In addition, by choosing alternative values 
for these parameters, we construct two additional scenarios: one in which the cross price 
elasticity is relatively low (equal to 0.02) and one in which it is relatively high (0.2). Given a 




INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 
Consider the results in Figure 2. Several interesting implications can be derived. First, 
for all three scenarios, raising the tax on freight above its reference level of 35 per cent is 
welfare-improving. This suggests that the reduction in the distortion on the freight market due 
to the tax increase more than offsets the increase in the distortion on the passenger market that 
the tax change causes. Second, the welfare change of a given freight tax adjustment strongly 
depends on the parameters that determine the price sensitivity of passenger transport demand 
with respect to the price of freight transport. For example, for a tax reform of 75 per cent, the 
high sensitivity scenario (0.2) generates larger welfare gains than the benchmark or low 
scenario. However, for a tax reform of more than 110 per cent, the high sensitivity scenario 
generates the lowest relative welfare gain. Third, we might expect that the higher the cross-
price effect, the higher the marginal costs of a policy, for any given marginal benefit, and the 
lower the optimal level of freight tax. This intuition is confirmed by the model. Under the 
benchmark scenario, welfare is maximised
8 by increasing the tax on freight to around 95 per 
cent – a just over two-and-a-half fold increase in the current rate. The optimal tax rate on 
freight is approximately 85 per cent in the high case and 115 per cent in the low case. This 
result is obviously conditional on the benchmark tax on passenger transport being less than 
marginal external cost. This is the finding of much of the transportation literature and appears 
to the case for our model - at least for benchmark levels of freight taxation.  
                                                      
8 The value of the increase in welfare at the optimal freight tax (the equivalent variation) equates to 
approximately 715 mEURO in 1995 prices.   18
In Figure 2, the excise tax on passenger transport is fixed at its benchmark value of 
35%. In Figure 3 we investigate the sensitivity of the results with respect to the passenger 
transport tax. We plot the change in social welfare as a function of the tax on freight  (a range 
from 60 % to 110 % is considered) for three different levels of the passenger transport tax. 
The benchmark level of the passenger tax is given by the middle of the three curves, and is 
just a repeat of the benchmark curve on Figure 2. The two other curves show social welfare 
when passenger transport excise taxes are (i) one-half of the benchmark level (the lowest 
curve), and (ii) double the benchmark level (the highest curve). 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND  HERE 
 
Two findings stand out from the results reported in Figure 3. First, the welfare gain of 
a given freight tax reform rises with the level of the passenger tax. This reflects the fact that, 
over the range of freight transport taxes considered, raising the tax on passengers is still 
welfare improving. Second, it is found that the higher the rate of passenger transport taxation, 
the lower the optimal freight tax. For instance, doubling benchmark passenger taxes reduces 
the optimal freight tax to approximately 80 per cent, while halving passenger taxes increases 
the optimal freight tax to 105 per cent. To interpret this latter finding, recall that raising the 
passenger transport tax has two implications. First, as a lower MEC implies a smaller 
distortion on the market for freight transport, it reduces the marginal benefit of raising the 
freight tax. Moreover, ceteris paribus, lower optimal
9 freight taxes result. Second, however, a 
lower MEC and higher passenger transport taxes reduce the distortive wedge () T MEC τ − on 
the passenger transport market, and thus also reduce the marginal cost of the policy reform 
due to the higher passenger transport demand induced by higher freight transport taxes.  
The information in Figure 3 therefore suggests that the first effect dominates in the 
determination of the optimal freight tax: higher passenger transport taxes reduce the marginal 
benefit of the policy reform by more than the cost, and hence the higher the rate of passenger 
transport taxation, the lower the optimal freight tax. This finding may have relevant policy 
implications for a stepwise introduction of congestion pricing on both passenger and freight 
transport. Suppose that it is currently not yet feasible, for political or technical reasons, to 
introduce congestion pricing in passenger transport and that the authorities start out by 
introducing an optimal freight tax, conditional on the current benchmark passenger tax rate. If 
                                                      
9 We recognise that the terminology here is potentially misleading. By optimal, we refer to the tax rate 
which maximises social welfare for any given level of other tax rates rather than the tax rate derived by 
optimising all taxes simultaneously.  Our numerical model is a simulation model rather than a full 
optimisation model.   19
later on taxing passengers becomes acceptable and the authorities decide to move towards 
higher passenger transport taxes, then from a welfare viewpoint it may be desirable to 
accompany this tax change with a simultaneous reduction in freight transport taxes.  
Given the range of passenger transport tax considered, it is perhaps surprising that the 
optimal freight tax is not more sensitive to these changes (optimal freight tax range between 
80 per cent and 105 per cent ). This is due to the fact that the passenger tax also changes the 
marginal cost of the policy – focusing solely on the change in the marginal benefits of the 
policy reform may bias policy analysis to a significant extent. 
As previously suggested, Figure 3 also shows that higher social welfare levels can be 
achieved by doubling passenger transport taxes than either maintaining benchmark levels or 
halving them. This naturally raises the question of what the optimal combination of passenger 
transport tax and freight tax might be. We perform a ‘grid-search’ with the simulation model: 
computing welfare levels under a large number of alternative assumptions concerning the two 
tax rates. We find that welfare is optimised by raising passenger transport taxes by a third to 
approximately 48% and freight taxes by a factor of two and a half, to 85%.  
As noted in Section III.2, a possible alternative instrument to tackle the input 
externality is an output tax on the dirty good. Figure 4 plots social welfare against the tax rate 
on freight for two tax levels on the dirty good: firstly, the case when the dirty good tax is set 
at its benchmark level (labelled ‘bmk’); secondly, the tax is raised by a amount equal to 5 per 
cent of the production cost (labelled ‘5 % tax on D’).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
There are three interesting results to be derived from Figure 4. First, at the benchmark 
level of freight taxation (35 per cent), the introduction of a 5 per cent tax on the dirty good is 
welfare improving
10. Secondly, as stressed in equation (9), the presence of a tax on the dirty 
good raises the marginal cost of the reform of freight taxation - the freight tax further reduces 
demand for a consumption good which is already distorted. This result is confirmed by the 
model. The presence of the output tax reduces the optimal freight tax from approximately 95 
per cent to 85 per cent. A third and final result is perhaps counter-intuitive. Figure 4 shows 
that welfare can be higher under the combination of a dirty good tax and a freight tax than 
under the freight tax alone. Using an additional tax instrument, only indirectly related to the 
externality-generating good, together with a direct externality tax can outperform the sole use 
of the latter. Recall, however, that two other distortions are present in the model: passenger   20
transport taxes and labour taxes, both of which are set at (non-optimal) benchmark levels. Our 
result illustrates the general theory of the second-best. 
We conclude this section by presenting some results on the use of the revenues. 
Numerical results presented so far are based on recycling through labour tax reductions. As 
Section III.5 stresses, under reasonable assumptions, returning revenues via labour taxes 
rather than lump-sum unambiguously reduces the marginal cost of the policy reform. Thus we 
might expect higher freight taxes and welfare levels when revenues are recycled via labour 
taxes. Figure 5 confirms this to be the case. The differences between recycling instruments 
are quite dramatic. Recycling via the lump-sum instrument raises welfare only marginally 
compared to labour tax recycling. Moreover, the optimal freight tax rate amounts to less than 
65 per cent for lump-sum recycling as compared to about 95 per cent in the case of recycling 
through the labour tax. Note that, for our model, labour supply indeed increases in the tax on 
freight when revenues are used to reduce labour taxes, while it decreases when revenues are 
returned lump-sum. Appendix 3 provides more details on some of the numerical results 
discussed above. 
 





The purpose of this paper was twofold. First, we developed a simple general 
equilibrium framework for the analysis of tax reform on dirty intermediate inputs in the 
presence of other distortions in the economy, with a special emphasis on the taxation of 
freight transport services. In view of rising congestion, tax reform for freight transport is high 
on the political agenda in many European countries. Second, we illustrated the main findings 
using a numerical model calibrated and applied to the UK economy for 1995. 
Our findings are easily summarised. The theoretical model shows that the desirability 
of raising taxes on dirty intermediate goods strongly depends on the presence of other 
distortions in the economy as well as on the instruments used to recycle the revenues of the 
tax reform. The numerical exercise produced the following findings. First, under a wide range 
of scenarios it was found that raising freight transport taxes is indeed welfare improving, even 
if passenger transport is substantially under-priced. Second, the higher the indirect cross-price 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Rather obviously, setting too high a level for the tax on D can reduce welfare. We find in the model, 
for instance, that welfare declines, given a fixed benchmark tax on freight, for a tax on D greater than 8 
per cent.   21
effect of freight taxes on passenger transport demand, the higher the marginal cost of a policy, 
for any given marginal benefit, and the lower the optimal level of freight tax. Third, the 
welfare gain of a given freight tax reform rises with the level of the passenger tax. Fourth, the 
higher the rate of passenger transport taxation, the lower the optimal freight tax. For instance, 
doubling benchmark passenger taxes reduces the optimal freight tax to approximately 80 per 
cent, while halving passenger taxes increases the optimal freight tax to 105 per cent.  
Finally, it was shown theoretically and illustrated numerically that, under reasonable 
assumptions, returning revenues via labour taxes rather than lump-sum, unambiguously 
reduces the marginal cost of the policy reform. As a consequence, higher freight taxes and 
welfare levels result when revenues are recycled via labour taxes. Numerically, the 
differences between recycling instruments are quite dramatic. Recycling via the lump-sum 
instrument raises welfare by only a small fraction of the gain made possible by labour tax 
recycling. Moreover, the optimal freight tax rate amounts to less than 65% under lump-sum 
recycling, compared to almost 90% for labour tax recycling. 
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Figure 1: the utility tree 
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Figure 5 Freight transport tax reform: comparing the effects of lump-sum and 
labour tax recycling of the tax revenues   27
Appendix 1: Deriving the welfare effect of a freight tax reform 
 
In this appendix we derive expression (7), which captures the change in welfare 
(measured in consumer income terms) from a tax-neutral increase in the tax rate  F τ  on freight 
transport, the dirty intermediate input. It can in general be written as: 
 
11 1
F FF F G
dW V V dG





In this notation, the variable after the vertical bar is held constant when taking the appropriate 
partial derivative. The last term on the right hand side gives the general equilibrium impact on 
the lump sum transfer of a balanced budget increase in the freight transport tax. It measures 
the potential for lump sum recycling made possible by the tax reform. 
Using Roy’s rule and Shephard’s lemma, it is easy to show that the first term on the 






















is the total effect of the tax increase on congestion. Similar standard 



















captures the full effect of the lump sum transfer on congestion. Substituting (A2) 
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, can be obtained by differentiating the government budget constraint. 
Denote   
  () (,,,, ,, ) TLDFX T L D F N D XN D R GT L F X D τττττ φ τ τ τ τ τ =+++ +  (A5)   28
where the dependency of the tax revenues per individual on all taxes, on the lump sum 
transfer and on congestion is made explicit. Moreover, note that congestion itself depends on 
taxes and transfers. Rewriting the government budget constraint as 
   (,,,, ,, ) TLDFX R GG τττττ φ = , 























Manipulating this expression gives 
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           (A6) 
 
To arrive at (7) it now suffices to work out the various terms and to appropriately 
define the marginal external cost of an increase in traffic. First, note that totally differentiating 
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In these expressions, ζ represents the feedback effect of altered congestion levels on the 
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The denominator captures the effects of increases in congestion on demand for both passenger 
and freight transport, and hence indirectly back on congestion. We assume that the 
denominator exceeds one, so that the feedback reduces the marginal external cost of an 
increase in transport flow: the resulting increase in congestion itself reduces transport demand 
and hence congestion. Note that the underlying assumption is mild, because every term in the 
curly bracketts is expected to be negative except the second. In other words, we implicitly 
assume that T is so large a substitute for D so as to make the denominator smaller than one.   
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 (A9) 
An increase in freight or passenger transport raises congestion for all consumers (first two 
terms). The initial effect, however, is reduced by the feedback on demand (third term). 
Finally, the term between square brackets captures the individual welfare cost to the 
consumer of the ultimate increase in congestion, expressed measured in terms of consumer 
income. This welfare effect consists of three distinct effects. First, more congestion increases 
the time required for making passenger transport trips. Using the envelope theorem (also see 
Section II.1), the associated welfare cost equals  T γ . Dividing by the consumer’s marginal 




higher congestion also raises the price of the dirty good via adjustments in input use and, 
therefore, in production costs. Using Roy’s identity, the welfare cost of this price increase, 







congestion has an impact on final consumption demands and thus on total tax revenues to the 






  Third, use (A5) to work out the impact of the freight tax and the lump sum transfer on 











and some simple algebra it is easy to find 
                                                      
11 Note that expression (A9) is closely related to the concept of the net-social Pigouvian tax 
defined by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), who measure the welfare cost in terms of government 
revenue rather than consumer income. 
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Finally, substitute (A7), (A8), (A10) and (A11) into (A6) and use (A9). The result can 
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         (A12) 
 
It is useful to emphasize that this equation is quite general and encompasses a number 
of more specific examples as special cases. As a consequence, it can be used to also study tax 
reform for markets that generate other types of externalities. First, many externalities do not 
imply feedbacks in demand. The welfare effect of a tax reform on an intermediate input 
creating this kind of externality (e.g., many types of emissions) is obtained by setting  1 ζ =  
in the definition of the marginal external cost, see (A9) above. Second, a pure consumer 







 in (A9). Finally, unlike in the model considered above (where passenger and freight 
services jointly produce the externality), in many cases of practical relevance (e.g., fertilizers, 
pesticides, energy), the externality is produced by the intermediate input only. It then suffices 
to set  T MEC τ = and to re-interpret the tax  F τ  in (A12) appropriately as a tax on, e.g., 
fertilizer.    31
 
Appendix 2: Benchmark equilibrium and parameter values of the 
numerical model 
 
  In this appendix we provide more details on the specification of the benchmark 
equilibrium (definition of clean and dirty consumption goods, expenditure and cost shares, 
benchmark tax rates, etc.) and on the parameter values and congestion function used in the 
numerical model.  
 
 
A.  The benchmark equilibrium 
 
Defining goods C and D. 
 
The structure of our numerical model, in turn reflecting the analytical model, makes 
the simplifying assumption that all freight expenditures are attributable to good D. It is 
therefore necessary to allocate each of the non-transport sectors in the GEM-E3 database to 
either aggregate good C or D.  
We allocate the six sectors with the highest expenditures on freight inputs to good D, 
and the remaining sectors to the clean good. Table 1 shows the sectors allocated to D and 
their respective shares of freight inputs in total freight expenditure (excluding non-market 
services, such as freight by the armed services). Approximately 80 per cent of total freight 
expenditures accord to good D. 
Ascribing all road freight expenditures to six sectors – which the data shows generate 
only 80 per cent of freight expenditures – is a potential source of bias in our model. Judgment 
is made more difficult by the failure of the GEM-E3 data to distinguish between road freight 
and other types of freight (rail, waterways etc).  
Consulting additional data-sources
12 suggests that the bias may be rather limited. A 
recent survey of road goods transport by the UK government (UK DETR, 2001a) suggests 




                                                      
12 The availability of such additional information was one of the key reasons why we calibrated the 
numerical model to the UK.  
13 This is based on Chart B of the survey. Differences in definitions complicate matters: however, we 
have sum the road freight usage of the following industries: food, drink and tobacco; bulk products 





Table 1 – The composite dirty good D 


















Benchmark expenditures shares on consumption goods and leisure 
 
Based on the GEM-E3 data, and adopting the definition of good D and C discussed 
above, results in the following shares of total expenditure on consumption goods: good D has 
approximately 55 per cent; good C has 40 per cent; and the remaining 5 per cent is on good T. 
The value of leisure is assumed to equal one-half of the total expenditures on commodities. 
 
 
Benchmark input expenditure shares 
 
The share of freight in the production expenditures of good D is calculated on the 
basis of the GEM-E3 database to equal approximately 15 per cent. Recalling that this dataset 
does not distinguish between road freight and other modes of freight transport, we assume 
expenditures are divided between modes in accordance with the ratio of total tonne-
kilometres between road and all other freight modes. The UK Government (U.K. DETR 
(2001b) - Table 1.14) report that, in 1995, approximately two-thirds of all freight tonne-
kilometres are attributable to road freight.  Hence we assume that 10 per cent of the value of 
good D production is attributable to road freight. This implies that the share of road-freight in 
the overall value of commodities equals 5 per cent. This is slightly lower than, but still   33
comparable to, a recent study for the Belgian economy, in which total freight expenditures are 




We assume that the average tax rate on wage income is 30 per cent. This corresponds 
closely to the GEM-E3 database. Passenger and freight transport are subject to ownership 
taxes and excise duty. In addition, passenger transport is subject to the standard rate of VAT. 
Using 1995 data from Peirson et al. (2001), we compute that the average rate of taxation 
(excluding VAT) on a passenger car trip 35 per cent. The corresponding figure for road 
freight is also 35 per cent. In addition, the standard rate of VAT in the U.K. is 17.5 per cent.  
 
 
B. Calibrating the model: the choice of Elasticities of Substitution 
 
It is necessary to make assumptions about the values of the elasticities of substitution 
employed in the numerical model: three in the consumer utility tree; and three in the 
production technology. It is standard to choose these values in such a way as to replicate as 
closely as possible any empirical estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities. The following 
values have been adopted for the utility tree:  1 0.8 σ = ;  2 0.6 σ =  and  3 1 σ = . On the 
production side:  D σ ,  T σ  and  F σ  are all set equal to unity.  
The partial elasticity of labour supply resulting from the model equals 0.31, which 
seems within the range of estimates in the literature (see, for example, Fuchs et al., 2000). 
Table 2 reports the matrix of own- and cross-price effects on T, F and D. Note that the 
reported elasticities are computed numerically as a linear approximation to the benchmark 
elasticities. They are general equilibrium elasticities: demands vary in response to both the 
change in consumer price of the good and the level of congestion. 
 
Table 2 Matrix of own and cross-price effects 
 T  F  D 
price of T  -0.25  0.08  0.03 
price of F  0.08  -0.39  -0.01 
price of D  0.27  -0.4  -0.42 
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The resulting estimates appear reasonable in sign and magnitude. The upper-left cell 
of the matrix gives the own-price elasticity of car use. There is a considerable literature on 
this topic and a reasonable range
14 seems to be -0.1 to -0.6. The cross-price effect on demand 
for freight is larger than for the dirty good: this reflects the greater attractiveness of freight 
inputs as congestion levels fall in response to higher passenger transport prices. 
Turning to the freight market, we note that the elasticity with respect to freight 
demand is much larger (in absolute level) than dirty good demand, reflecting the relatively 
high degree of input substitutability . We have been unable to find much empirical literature 
on the price elasticity of freight use. In a study for central and northeastern United States, 
Friendlander and Spady (1981) estimate the long run own-price elasticity of trucking 
manufactured goods to be –0.9 and for bulk goods –0.88. Our model is better suited to short-
run responses
15, and hence it is reasonable that our figure is (in absolute terms) smaller than 
Friendlander and Spady’s. However, as reported in Figure 1, we employ sensitivity analysis 
around our benchmark value. 
Finally, for the dirty good, feedback effects via the congestion function ensure that 
the own-price elasticity (of the dirty good) is larger (in absolute terms) than the elasticity with 
respect to freight input demand. 
 
C. The congestion function 
 
Implementation of the model requires a particular functional form mapping the 
demand for freight and passenger transport to the time required per trip: the so-called 
congestion function. We adopt an exponential function: this is supported empirically on the 
basis of an aggregation exercise with urban network models (Mahony and Kirwan, 2001) and 
has been used in a number of recent studies of transport pricing (De Borger and Proost, 2001). 
Thus the time required to travel a kilometre is assumed to be given by: 
  12 3 4
1
[( ) ] t i m e k kE x pk T kF
speed
== + +  
where  1 k ,  2 k  and  3 k  are unknown parameters, T  and F  are measured in vehicle kilometres, 
while  4 k  converts freight vehicle-kilometres into car-equivalents, and, as appears to be 
                                                      
14 Standard references include Small (1992) and Goodwin (1992). In addition, Dahl (1995) reviews 39 
aggregate econometric studies on the price elasticity of gasoline demand for fuel in the U.S. and 
concludes that the median short-run estimate is –0.13, while the median long-run estimate is –0.65. 
However, given improving fuel-efficiency, we might well expect that the elasticity with respect to 
kilometres travelled is smaller than that with respect to fuel demand. 
15 As is well known, CES models impose a unity income elasticity, which makes them often unsuitable 
for long-run prediction.    35
standard
16, is assumed henceforth to equal 2. Benchmark vehicle flows are based on 
government statistics (U.K. DETR, 2001b) suggesting that only one-fifth of vehicle flows are 
from freight.  
We calibrate the 3 unknown parameters to 3 point estimates of speed and demand 
aggregated across all English motorways and major arterial roads (UK DETR, 1998), reported 
in Table 3. 
Table 3 – UK speed-flow data  
time period  mPCUs /hr
17 speed  (km/hr) 
am peak  22.66  74 
inter-peak 18.49  83.3 
Freeflow 0 110 
 
 
Appendix 3: Detailed model output 
 
The model produces, for each simulation exercise performed, a large number of 
potentially interesting results on all of the central variables in the model. Table 4 presents 
greater detail on some crucial model variables for a few of the simulations underlying the 
results reported above. The variables considered are welfare, speed, labour supply, demand 
for the dirty good, and demand for both for passenger and freight transport. For three levels of 
the tax on freight (the benchmark level of 35 per cent, a tax rate of 75 per cent and a rate of 
115 per cent) we give the percentage change in each variable relative to the reference case 
where all variables were at their benchmark levels. Moreover, three scenarios are presented: 
the column marked ‘BMK’ refers to the benchmark scenario; the column marked ‘ 0.05 D τ = ’ 
refers to introduction of a 5 per cent tax on the dirty good; and, finally, the column marked 
‘lump-sum recycling’ refers to a scenario in which revenues are returned in a lump-sum 
manner rather than via reduced labour taxes.  
                                                      
16 Arnott (2001) challenges this type of approach. He argues that trucks are more usefully seen as 
reducing road capacity. He shows that this implies that the number of car equivalents of a truck is 
increasing in the number of trucks.  
17 mPCUs refers to million passenger-car units. Demand from buses, vans and trucks, therefore, is 
converted into equivalent units of car demand via fixed ratios.   36
  To illustrate the interpretation of the Table, consider as an example the impact of a 
few simple scenarios on passenger and freight transport demand and on welfare. First, with 
labour tax recycling and in the absence of a tax on the dirty good, raising the freight transport 
tax from 35 to 75 per cent raises passenger transport demand by slightly more than 2 per cent; 
freight transport goes down by 9.66 per cent. Welfare rises by 0.075 per cent. Second, in the 
presence of an additional tax on D, the same increase in freight tax raises passenger transport 
demand by 3.71 per cent and reduces freight demand by 11.57 per cent. Welfare increases a 
bit more (by 0.085), reflecting that a 75 per cent tax on freight is still short of the welfare 
optimum: an additional dirty goods tax is welfare-improving. Third, the same freight tax 
increase would hardly affect welfare if recycling were through the lump-sum instrument: 
welfare rises by 0.014 per cent compared to 0.075 per cent in the case of recycling via the 
labour tax.    
Table 4 Example of more detailed model output 
Variables  τF  BMK  τD=0.05  lump-sum 
recycling 
Welfare  35 0  0.027  0 
 75  0.075  0.085  0.014 
 115  0.078  0.074  -0.031 
Speed  35 0  0.65  0 
 75  4.05  4.62  4.13 
 115  7.42  7.92  7.56 
L  35 0  0.2 0 
 75  0.32  0.28  -0.01 
 115  0.57  0.74  -0.04 
D  35 0  1.37  0 
 75  -0.67  3.71  2.31 
 115  -0.77  5.65  4.22 
T  35 0  1.37  0 
 75  2.37  3.71  2.31 
 115  4.33  5.65  4.22 
F  35 0  -2.03  0 
 75  -9.66  -11.57  -9.8 
 115  -18.07  -19.85  -18.32 
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